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Title: Food Regimes, Capital, State, and Class: Friedmann and McMichael Revisited 3 
 4 
Abstract 5 
Friedmann and McMichael’s work, through their concept of the ‘food regime’, has been 6 
foundational to our thinking about the relation between capitalism, the state, and agriculture. 7 
Given the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of their seminal 1989 paper in this journal 8 
(Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the 9 
Present) it seems very appropriate to commemorate this event by undertaking a 10 
reassessment of that paper. This paper undertakes such a reassessment by examining and 11 
critiquing: the theoretical assumptions underlying the paper, particularly in relation to 12 
capitalism, class, and the state. This directs attention particularly to: the authors’ (implicit) 13 
definition of capitalism; the relation between capitalism and the modern state; their 14 
treatment of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’; and their periodization of food regimes and the 15 
dynamics underlying them, these being premised on their theoretical assumptions. The 16 
second, third, and, fourth sections occupy the bulk of the paper. The second section develops 17 
a significantly revised theoretical foundation for thinking about the dynamics underlying food 18 
regimes, while the third section deploys this as the basis for a new periodization of food 19 
regimes. This periodization includes a proposed Fifth, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime, and 20 





Friedmann and McMichael’s work, through their concept of the ‘food regime’, has been 26 
pivotal to our thinking about the relation between capitalism, the state, and agriculture. 27 
Given the thirtieth anniversary of the publication of their seminal 1989 paper in this journal 28 
(Agriculture and the State System: The Rise and Decline of National Agricultures, 1870 to the 29 
Present) it seems very appropriate to commemorate this event by undertaking a 30 
reassessment of that paper. We propose to undertake such a reassessment by, first, 31 
examining and critiquing the theoretical bases of food regimes as presented by Friedmann 32 
and McMichael, together with their periodization of these regimes. Arising from this critique, 33 
we go on to develop a significantly revised theoretical foundation for thinking about the 34 
dynamics underlying food regimes, and to deploy this as the basis for proposing a new 35 
periodization of food regimes. 36 
It is perhaps useful to remind ourselves at the outset what we mean by food regimes. Food 37 
Regime Theory (FRT)i represents an attempt to ground understanding of the organization of 38 
food production, distribution, and consumption on a world scale in political economy – in 39 
other words, to understand how capitalism and the modern state generate and structure 40 
this organization. As defined by Friedmann and McMichael (1989), the co-originators of the 41 
theory, FRT describes three global food regimes: the First (1870s-1930s); the Second (1950s-42 
1970s); and the Third (from 1980s-present), the latter described as the ‘corporate’ food 43 
regime by McMichael (2013) and as the ‘corporate-environmental’ regime by Friedmann 44 
(2005). Friedmann and McMichael articulated the food regime as an historically significant 45 
cluster of global-scale food relationships which contributed to stabilizing and underwriting a 46 
period of growth in global capitalism. A food regime comprised a series of key relationships, 47 
often enshrined in rule-making and enforcing institutions. Following, in part, a Regulation 48 
Theoretical (RT) interpretation of capitalist historyii, these relationships coalesced to form a 49 
relatively stable pattern of accumulation (historical conjuncture) over a period of time, 50 
before then destabilizing and moving into disjuncture and crisis (Campbell and Dixon 2009, 51 
263). 52 
In contrast to much of the criticism that was directed against it in the 1990s from then 53 
ascendant thinking in post-structuralism and actor-network theory particularly (thinking that 54 
McMichael (2013, 12) describes as ‘abstract localism’), our critique seeks, in this paper, both 55 
to uphold the tradition of radical political economy that informed Friedmann and 56 
McMichael’s paper, and the value of the concept of the food regime itself. Our critique, 57 
therefore, takes place from within that tradition. That tradition, however, is diverse and may 58 
be said to comprise, not one, but rather several main strands of thought which, at risk of over-59 
simplification, may be grouped into three schools:  60 
The first school, which may be termed the ‘market-relations model’, is one in which capitalism 61 
is seen to arise through an increase in trade and the rise of an international division of labouriii.  62 
This line of thinking is represented particularly well by Wallerstein (1974, 1976) in his World 63 
Systems Theory (WST), and, it is important to note, WST has constituted one of the two main 64 
intellectual influences on the development of FRT (McMichael 2013) (the other, as noted, 65 
being RT, which, we argue, Friedmann and McMichael employ only in part, to the detriment 66 
of their formulation of FRT). We will present a critique of this approach, which, rightly in our 67 
view, has been accused of ‘structuralism’ and ‘abstract globalism’, not least by McMichael 68 
himself (2013) in his recent ‘retrospective’ on FRT. We will argue, however, that, despite his 69 
auto-critique, it is difficult to discern McMichael’s rejection of ‘structuralism’ being translated 70 
into his substantive and contemporary analysis of the ‘corporate’ food regime, which 71 
polarizes precisely into the abstract globalization of capital and the abstract localization of 72 
resistance, the latter occurring, for McMichael, essentially ‘outside’ the dynamics of what we 73 
will term the ‘state-capital nexus’. Such charges of ‘structuralism’ are perhaps ironic, since it 74 
was Friedmann and McMichael’s intent, by means of FRT, to break out of the determinism 75 
and linearity of ‘structural Marxism’ (the ‘second school’, see below), an impulse, as implied 76 
above, that has only increased, if not always been realized, since 1989 (see Campbell and 77 
Dixon 2009). Indeed, these authors suggest that ‘it is only possible…to understand the 78 
significance of these new perspectives by understanding food regimes as a key historical and 79 
theoretical pivot that moved debates in rural sociology from a rather narrow, structural and 80 
orthodox political economy of agriculture to a more contingent, historically contextual 81 
understanding of the many configurations…of agri-food capitalisms’ (Campbell and Dixon 82 
2009, 261).  83 
We argue, however, and as implied above, that, in the case of McMichael, theoretical 84 
provision for such ‘contingency’ has not been realized other than ‘outside’ the regime (see 85 
Tilzey 2017), while, in the case of Friedmann, her theoretical shift to engage ‘contingency’ has 86 
been undertaken through her partial embrace of post-structural and post-modern frames, 87 
which fail, however, to afford a rigorous basis for conceptualizing ‘contingency’.  We argue 88 
that this unresolved tension between ‘structure’ and ‘contingency’ in FRT, as presented by 89 
Friedmann and McMichael, arises through their failure to embrace RT in its entirety, together 90 
with their apparent lack of awareness of other important and related developments in ‘post-91 
structuralist’ (but not ‘post-structural’) Marxian theory – notably, ‘Political Marxism’, 92 
Poulantzian state-capital theory, and neo-Gramscian theory. Indeed, it may be argued that 93 
this unresolved tension and the failure to find a theoretical basis for theorizing the dialectic 94 
between ‘structure’ and ‘agency’, underlies, to a considerable degree, the great schism that 95 
emerged in the 1990s, within rural geography and sociology, between the ‘structuralism’ of 96 
‘abstract globalism’ and the ‘post-structural’ frame of ‘abstract localism’. Further, it was this 97 
‘abstract globalism’ which mandated, and continues to mandate, its mirror image ‘abstract 98 
localism’. Below, and through the development of ‘Political Marxian’ and related approaches, 99 
we will attempt to vitiate this dualism of the two ‘abstractions’ by means of revised 100 
conceptions of capitalism, classiv, agency, and statev.vi     101 
The second school of radical political economy may be termed the ‘relations of production’ 102 
approach, one that has often been equated with ‘structural Marxism’, and one whose 103 
inadequacies helped to propel the rise of ‘post-modernism’ and ‘post-structural’ approaches 104 
during the 1980s and 1990s (indeed, in the minds of many of the latter, ‘structural Marxism’ 105 
is Marxism). Indeed, Friedman and McMichael’s embrace of WST (and of RT) itself 106 
represented a reaction against the reductionism of the ‘relations of production’ approach. 107 
This is not the place to undertake a detailed discussion of this school (see useful summary in 108 
Campbell and Dixon (2009) in relation to rural sociology) – suffice to say that, for it, ‘modes 109 
of production’ are defined by the direct relationship between exploiter and exploited at the 110 
level of the enterprise. This fails, however, to understand that the direct exploitation of labour 111 
is but a ‘moment’ in the production process as capital is forced beyond the immediate labour 112 
process in order to reproduce itself. That is why Marx was, himself, careful to avoid any 113 
reduction of his definition of capitalism to this immediate relation itself. Rather, ‘the relations 114 
of production in their totality constitute what are called the social relations, society, and 115 
specifically at a definite stage of historical development’ (Marx 1973, 90). In other words, we 116 
need to address the totality of dialectical relations between capital, class, and the state (the 117 
state-capital nexus) if we are to gain a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of 118 
capitalism and the state system, and the place of food regimes within these.  119 
This we attempt to do in this paper by building on the third school of radical political economy, 120 
which, we argue, represents a resolution to the problems of the first two schools, and which 121 
takes as its starting point Marx’s desire, non-reductively, to understand capitalism in terms of 122 
the totality of social relations. This third school, we suggest, may be said to comprise elements 123 
of Political Marxism, Neo-Gramscian theory, Poulantzian state-theory, and RT in its entirety.  124 
 125 
The paper has the following structure. First, we assess and critique the theoretical 126 
assumptions underlying Friedmann and McMichael’s 1989 paper, particularly in relation to 127 
capitalism, class, and the state. This directs attention particularly to: the authors’ (implicit) 128 
definition of capitalism; the relation between capitalism and the modern state; their 129 
treatment of ‘class’ and ‘class struggle’. In this section we also assess and critique their 130 
periodization of food regimes and the dynamics underlying them, these being premised on 131 
the theoretical assumptions discussed beforehand. In the next section, we attempt a 132 
synthesis of the elements of the ‘third school’ of radical political economy to develop a theory 133 
of the ‘state-capital nexus’ in preference to WST and the dismembered RT deployed by 134 
Friedmann and McMichael (see below), and as a key explanatory tool for understanding and 135 
defining food regimes. In the third section, we use this theory, in conjunction with a re-136 
assessment of historical source material, to propose a revised periodization of, and rather 137 
more complex dynamic underlying, food regimes. As part of this new periodization, we 138 
propose, inter alia, a Fifth, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime, and the final section explores 139 
the rationale underlying this proposed, and current, regime. 140 
 141 
 142 
Problems with Friedmann and McMichael’s Theorization, and Periodization of Food 143 
Regimes 144 
 145 
In their 1989 paper, Friedmann and McMichael sought to explore, as a key objective, ‘the role 146 
of agriculture in the development of the capitalist world economy, and in the trajectory of 147 
the state system’ (1989, 93). A re-assessment of their paper would reasonably be expected 148 
to ask, therefore, how these authors understand and define capitalism and the state, the 149 
relation between capitalism and the state, and the relation between states. We undertake 150 
this task below. Also fundamental to food regime dynamics, and to those of capitalism and 151 
the state, we argue, are class relations. These relations do not, however, receive prominence 152 
in Friedmann and McMichael’s paper. 153 
 154 
First, we address Friedmann and McMichael’s treatment of capitalism. Interestingly, they 155 
provide no explicit definition of this concept, but do refer to Aglietta (1979), a key figure in 156 
RT. Here, however, they reference only his discussion of capital accumulation (theorized as a 157 
‘Regime of Accumulation’ from which we assume the term ‘food regime’ derives) and fail to 158 
address the ‘Mode of Regulation’, a category of equal significancevii. Shorn of the ‘Mode of 159 
Regulation’, it is difficult to comprehend capitalism as a class-defined and contradiction-160 
ridden mode of exploitation that exists in an ‘internal’ relation to the modern state, the latter 161 
performing vital support and legitimacy functions for capital without which it would be in 162 
jeopardy (van Apeldoorn et al. 2012). 163 
Second, and conjoined to the above, their conceptualization of the relation between 164 
capitalism and the modern state is seriously under-theorized. This concerns their neglect of 165 
the twin aspects of this relation that enable us to make sense of both entities in their 166 
dialectical co-constitution: the ‘separation in unity’ of the institutional spheres of the 167 
‘economy’ and ‘polity’, and the complementary accumulation and legitimation functions of 168 
the state in relation to capital as defined by RT (Boyer and Saillard 2002). Friedmann and 169 
McMichael, however, deploy a dichotomous, rather than dialectical, understanding of the 170 
state-capital relation, with both entities reified and de-historicizedviii. Their modern state 171 
seems to be nothing more than the contingent outcome of a sectoral articulation between 172 
agriculture and industry. We suggest that an understanding of the state-capital relation needs 173 
to go far deeper than this, however. Following Poulantzas (1978), it is more helpful to see the 174 
state, given the lack of ‘extra-economic’ influence that individual capitals can exert, as 175 
providing the essential institutional space for various fractions of the capitalist class, in 176 
addition possibly to other classes, to come together to form longer-term strategies and 177 
alliances whilst, simultaneously, the state disorganizes non-capitalist classes through various 178 
means of co-optation and division. The state, also for reasons of legitimation, must, 179 
additionally, be ‘relatively autonomous’ from the interests and demands of particular 180 
fractions of capital, and even from capital ‘in general’. So, as Poulantzas (1978) suggests, the 181 
state represents the condensation of the balance of class forces in society. For Friedmann and 182 
McMichael, by contrast, capital is a unitary entity, bereft of specific class and class fractional 183 
content, and is counter-posed to a ‘state’, a content-less abstraction which apparently 184 
represents, without mediation, the position of a generalized counter-movement. This aligns 185 
with a Polanyian, indeed neoclassical, conception of the state and capital as essentialized and 186 
opposed entities. McMichael’s later conceptualization of the ‘corporate’ food regime seems 187 
to be a direct outgrowth of this view, neglecting the enduring importance of divergent 188 
fractions of capital in current dynamics and the pervasive significance of the territorial form, 189 
and potentially imperialist character, of the state. We suggest, by contrast, that the modern 190 
state is better conceptualized itself as a social relation. That is, an arena or container (the 191 
state-capital nexus) (Taylor 1994; van Apeldoorn et al. 2012), within which class contestation 192 
and compromise is played out, principally to secure the material and ideological reproduction 193 
of the hegemonic fractions of capital, even where these may be transnational in orientation.  194 
Third, Friedmann and McMichael either neglect, or deploy a deficient, class analysis, 195 
especially concerning inter-class ‘struggle’. From this derives serious shortcomings in their 196 
presentation of state/capital dynamics involving class contestation and compromiseix. In this, 197 
their stance has affinities with Polanyi’s avoidance of class and class contestation as causal 198 
factors in political economic dynamics (Tilzey 2017). By contrast, we suggest here, in line with 199 
the schools of Political Marxism (Brenner 1985; Mooers 1991; Wood 2002) and Neo-200 
Gramscian IPE (Bieler and Morton 2004), that the prime mover in the formation and 201 
reproduction of food regimes is the social-property relations in the hegemonic state (in the 202 
world system) and the international articulation of these relations with receptive and 203 
complementary class interests in other states. This points to the pivotal importance of class, 204 
class struggle, and ‘hegemony’ in the birth and subsequent nurturing within the state-capital 205 
nexus as ‘national policy’, and then projection beyond the hegemon, of a specific regime of 206 
accumulation and, within it, a food regime. ‘National policy’, stated otherwise, is the outcome 207 
of coalitions within the state-capital nexus, arising in turn from class contestation and 208 
compromise between hegemonic, sub-hegemonic, and oppositional interest groups.  209 
Should this ‘national policy’ successfully augment, through expanded capital accumulation, 210 
the power of the state, this state may then, through international projection of its regime of 211 
accumulation, aspire to the status of hegemon in the inter-state system. This process is 212 
exemplified by the emergence of the British ‘free trade’ food regime (1840s-1870s) as the 213 
first international capitalist regime of this kind, denoted by Tilzey (2018), consequently, as 214 
the ‘first’ or ‘Liberal’ Food Regime. It is cross-national class coalitions and international 215 
alliances which act as conduits for the dissemination of a food regime. Such a class agential 216 
process obtains even in relations between a hegemon and a subordinate state, as between 217 
‘core’ imperial states and those of the ‘periphery’, for example, in which case peripheral 218 
extroverted class fractions and imperial transnational class interests may fabricate 219 
symbiosesx. Thus, food regimes comprise specific forms of capital accumulation, and these 220 
forms comprise the favoured interests of a class fraction or coalition of class fractions within 221 
the hegemonic state, interests which may then be projected politically, via conscious class 222 
agency, into the international arena. Given that the intention is to augment the power of the 223 
state-capital nexus, this may generate relations of ‘combined and uneven development’ with 224 
other states (see next section).  225 
Fourthly, Friedmann and McMichael fail to articulate a theory of agency that might conjoin 226 
the categories of capital, state, and class by means of political action. Thus, while failing to 227 
identify the internal relations between capital and state, and the crucial understanding of 228 
both as class relations, they also fail, consequently, to grasp the role of class as a ‘bridging’ 229 
concept, one that encapsulates both structure and agency, or class position and positionality 230 
(Potter and Tilzey 2005). This concept, as ‘structured agency’, makes it possible to identify the 231 
class fractional interests that comprise capitalist social relations and directs attention to 232 
strategies and understandings deployed by political agents in the defence or promotion of 233 
their interests. Elsewhere, this has been termed the ‘strategic relational approach’ (Jessop 234 
2005), relating structure that defines positions to social practices/discourses (positionalities) 235 
of agentsxi.  236 
We now turn to an assessment of the framing of the relations between capitalism, the state, 237 
and class that appear to guide Friedmann and McMichael’s substantive depiction of specific 238 
food regimes and, deriving from this, their periodization of these regimes. 239 
The first major problem with Friedmann and McMichael’s substantive characterization of 240 
food regimes relates to the causal dynamics they identify as underlying their so-called ‘first’ 241 
food regime. They assert that the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand (one might add 242 
Argentina and Uruguay), as independent settler states: 1) supplied cheap wage foods to the 243 
new European working class. While they certainly provisioned Britain, by contrast Germany 244 
and France, in their desire to foment articulated economies, erected protectionist barriers 245 
against such imports (Koning 1994; Tilzey 2018); 2) ushered in a novel form of trade, ordered 246 
internationally for the first time, and concurrent with a colonial relation. This is questionable, 247 
since the preceding free trade era (denoted the ‘first’ or ‘Liberal’ food regime by Tilzey (2018)) 248 
was likewise international but did not, with the exception of Britain, entail colonialism. The 249 
succeeding ‘Imperial’ regime (Tilzey 2018) was characterized by protectionism in Europe, 250 
permitting Germany and France to industrialize. They assert, very dubiously, that this new 251 
order operated on the basis of comparative advantage ‘as an apparent automatic mechanism 252 
of specialization’ (Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 93). In actuality, protectionism was the 253 
antithesis of comparative advantage, with the previous ‘Liberal’ food regime embodying this 254 
latter principle (Tilzey 2018).  255 
The second problem concerns their assumption of direct continuity from the late 19th century 256 
system to that of the 20th century US hegemony, in which this state, through grain 257 
exports/food aid, guaranteed completion of the state system in the global South. Despite the 258 
truth of the latter, there is a tenuous connection between the 19th century export regime and 259 
the 20th century Keynesian surplus disposal regime (Tilzey 2018). Imperialism characterized 260 
US relations with the global South during the ‘Imperial’ food regime and these were inimical 261 
to completion of the state system (Koning 1994). The latter project was disjunctural with the 262 
‘Imperial’ regime and arose from a singular confluence of Keynesian policies and cold war 263 
politics following the Second World War. 264 
The third problem concerns Friedmann and McMichael’s temporal delimitation of their 265 
international regimes: ‘We organize our argument around the concept of the food regime, 266 
which links international relations of food production and consumption to forms of capital 267 
accumulation, broadly distinguishing periods of capitalist transformation since 1870’ 268 
(Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95). This starting point appears to stem from Aglietta 269 
(1979), but why 1870? It might have made more sense to start in the 1840s when the ‘Liberal’ 270 
food regime began (Tilzey 2018). Or, indeed, given their intellectual debt to WST, one might 271 
reasonably ask why the ‘first’ food regime did not emerge some five hundred years ago (see 272 
below for critique of this assertion of the generalized appearance of capitalism at this early 273 
date). The reason appears to be that ‘it allows us to characterize late 19th century capitalism 274 
as an extensive form, constructing capitalist production through the quantitative growth of 275 
wage labour; and mid-20th century capitalism as an intensive form, reconstructing 276 
consumption relations as part of the process of capital accumulation’ (Friedmann and 277 
McMichael 1989, 95). It is contentious, however, to assert that the core economies of the 278 
‘age of empire’ (Hobsbawm 1987) were constructed around the quantitative growth of 279 
labour, or absolute surplus value. As Amin (1977) demonstrates, the hallmark of the ‘Imperial’ 280 
regime was the emergence of qualitative growth, or relative surplus valuexii, as the foundation 281 
of autocentrism and of the nation-state, Germany being exemplary (Mooers 1991; Koning 282 
1994; Byres 1996). 283 
Lastly, Friedmann and McMichael (1989, 95) assert, dubiously, that ‘settler agriculture was 284 
the centrepiece of the formation of metropolitan nation-states’. While causally embroiled in 285 
the genesis of the European state-capital nexus, it did not itself engender nation-state 286 
formation. The emergence of sectorally and socially articulated development was premised, 287 
rather, on the erection of tariffs against cheap imports and in favour of national agricultures 288 
(Koning 1994; Mazoyer and Roudart 2006). Had comparative advantage held sway, as in the 289 
preceding ‘Liberal’ era, autocentrism would have proven impossible. In contrast to Germany 290 
and France, Britain did continue to rely on cheap imports to underwrite industrial 291 
competitiveness but at the expense of its national agriculture, which continued its decline 292 
(Koning 1994). 293 
  294 
Proposing a Revised Causal Basis for Food Regimes 295 
In defining a basis for FRT that has greater explanatory power than that offered by Friedmann 296 
and McMichael in their reliance on WST and partial rendering of RT, we propose here the use 297 
of ‘Political Marxism’, in alliance with neo-Gramscian International Political Economy (Cox 298 
1987; Bieler 2004; Morton 2007) and a full rendering of RT (as specified above). The first 299 
necessity is to develop an understanding of modern capitalism as opposed to ‘merchant’ or 300 
‘commercial capitalism’, terms conflated by WST. Following Marx (1981) there is a need to 301 
specify modern capitalism in terms of class relations, composed of owners of the means of 302 
production counter-posed to an expropriated class ‘free’ to sell its labour power, in which, 303 
for the first time, power over production is exerted ‘economically’, not ‘politically’. As long as 304 
means of production are owned by capitalists and denied to labourers, the ‘dull compulsion 305 
of the economic’ obliges the latter to sell their labour power to the former. Modern capitalism 306 
is thus a ‘qualitatively new phenomenon, a new mode of mobilizing social labour in the 307 
transformation of nature’ (Wolf 1982, 85). This contrasts markedly with the WST tradition 308 
where, following Weber and Braudel, capitalism is seen simply as an expansion of processes 309 
already at work within feudalism.  310 
 311 
If WST has no specific theory of capitalism, then, equally, it has no specific theory of the 312 
modern state. This is so because the newly constituted and institutionally separated spheres 313 
of the ‘political’ and the ‘economic’ are dialectically cognate and implied, with their very 314 
‘separation in unity’ a consequence of the commodification of labour power and the 315 
establishment of absolute property rights in the means of production. At the same time, the 316 
modern state acquires a strategic ‘political’ role which the individual capitalist cannot fulfil. 317 
The state was instrumental in effecting the process of ‘primitive accumulation’ which created 318 
a proletariat ‘free’ to sell its labour power to the capitalist (Perelman 2000). Once capitalism 319 
was installed, the state deployed its power further to maintain and guarantee absolute 320 
property rights by the capitalist class, and to institute and support regimes of work discipline 321 
required by this new mode (Wolf 1982, 100). The modern state also assumed the essential 322 
role of arbitrating and managing contestation between fractions of capital (and between 323 
capitalists and its labour force) and of representing their interests in the inter-national arena.  324 
 325 
This Marxian understanding of capitalism enables us to see that this new ‘mode of 326 
production’ emerged first, in mature form, only in England in the 18th century (Wolf 1982), 327 
although its origins may be traced back to the 15th century, again only in England (Brenner 328 
1989; Wood 2002; Teschke 2003; Lacher 2006; Dimmock 2014). Contra WST (including Arrighi 329 
(1994)), capitalism was not, therefore, a Europe-wide phenomenon prior to the 19th century, 330 
nor can the imperial dynamics of Portugal, Spain, and France be attributed to its logic – rather 331 
these dynamics were of mercantile capitalism as an adjunct to the absolutist state variant of 332 
feudalism (or the ‘tributary mode of production’ according to Wolf (1982)).  333 
 334 
Our qualitative view, presented first in modern times by Robert Brenner (1977, 1985) and 335 
pivoting around his concept of ‘social-property relations’, is now referred to as ‘Political 336 
Marxism’. Drawing inspiration from Marx’s mature works, notably Grundrisse and Capital, 337 
Brenner accords priority to the dynamics of class contestation in a strategic relational sense. 338 
Key to understanding modern capitalism for Marx and Brenner is ‘primitive accumulation’. 339 
Like Marx, Brenner rejects Adam Smith’s understanding of this concept, in which it is the 340 
accumulated wealth from mercantile capital that is seen as pivotal in the transition to modern 341 
capitalism, a view replicated in WST and described as ‘neo-Smithian Marxism’ by Brenner 342 
(1977). By contrast, Marx and Brenner see primitive accumulation as predicated on the 343 
separation of the peasantry from their means of production.  344 
 345 
Brenner, rather than employing the term ‘social relations of production’, prefers that of 346 
‘social-property relations’, principally because the former ‘is sometimes taken to convey the 347 
idea that the social structural framework in which production takes place is somehow 348 
determined by production itself, that is, the form of cooperation or organization of the labour 349 
process’ (Brenner 2007, 58). Brenner sees ‘disastrous consequences’ for specifying social 350 
system dynamics arising from the usual restrictive use of the ‘social relations of production’ 351 
concept (as with the ‘second’ school of radical political economy). First, the importance of 352 
property relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers is missed; and 353 
second, power relations between surplus appropriators and surplus producers that are 354 
actually pivotal to specifying class dynamics are relegated to the ‘political superstructure’. 355 
Thus, while surplus in pre-capitalist societies cannot be appropriated other than by political 356 
means, even in capitalism the ‘political superstructure’ of the state is actually infrastructural 357 
with respect to the accumulation and legitimation needs of capital.  358 
 359 
Brenner, therefore, does not restrict attention to inter-class relations between capitalists and 360 
proletariat, for example. Intra-class contestation between capital fractions and between 361 
nation-states is considered of equal significance in capitalist dynamics. The ‘social-property 362 
relations’ formulation thus enables the traditionally ‘reified’ regions of the ‘economic’ and 363 
the ‘political’ to be strongly re-integrated. It also enables the state to be re-configured as a 364 
causally and theoretically meaningful entity in social system dynamics. 365 
 366 
This conceptualization suggests the primacy of ‘political’ dynamics, or ‘class struggle’ around 367 
the key issues of ‘who owns what, who does what, who gets what, and what do they do with 368 
it?’ (Bernstein 2010, 22), mediated by discourse and the cultural politics of positionality, 369 
framed within the social formation, or ‘state’, comprising a distinct constellation of social-370 
property relations and given coherence by a singular jurisdictional authority – within 371 
capitalism typically the nation-state. In contrast to the ‘externalist’ or ‘functionalist’ approach 372 
of WST, Political Marxism considers social formations to be co-conditioning – in other words, 373 
‘external’ relations are mediated, refracted, and distilled out by the social-property relations 374 
of each social formation to constitute an ‘internal’ dynamic which co-develops, with varying 375 
degrees of asymmetry, with other social formations.  376 
 377 
This conceptualization helps us to understand the co-evolution of capitalism and the modern 378 
state in 17th and 18th century England. The competitive edge afforded to the British state-379 
capital nexus by first agrarian and then industrial capitalism led to the adoption, in modified 380 
form, of these social-property relations by other ‘core’ states in Europe and North America 381 
during the course of the 19th century. The constitution of capitalist food regimes was a key 382 
element of this process. Sooner or later, however, the constraints on the level of surplus value 383 
which could be generated within the confines of the nation-state began to be encountered, 384 
and capital, still grounded in the enabling and protective structure of the state, embarked on 385 
programmes of ‘combined and uneven development’xiii, or imperialism (Trotsky 2008). This 386 
meant, and means, that capitalist growth in ‘core’ states occurs through ‘combined and 387 
uneven development’ with a consequent ‘periphery’, the latter’s development distorted to 388 
the benefit of the ‘core’ and peripheral comprador classes. Again, contra WST, this should not 389 
be understood in ‘functionalist’ terms according to the abstract logic of the ‘world system’, 390 
but rather as predicated on class and class fractional agency within the context of the state-391 
capital nexus, and on power relations between the latter. Thus, ‘the pressures of uneven 392 
development are clearly mediated through different forms of state as nodal points of 393 
nationally specific configurations of class fractions and struggles over hegemony and/or 394 
passive revolution within accumulation conditions on a world scale’ (Morton 2010, 229).  395 
 396 
This discussion enables us, following van Apeldoorn et al. (2012, 474), to distil out the key 397 
internal relations between capital and state which the state-capital nexus deploys to secure 398 
economic growth and political stability, and which frame the form and function of food 399 
regimes. These are: 400 
1. Market creation: to engender, if necessary, re-establish, and ensure the effective 401 
functioning of markets, including the preconditions for capital accumulation like 402 
‘primitive accumulation’; 403 
2. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation 404 
and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the 405 
subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function); 406 
3. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital 407 
fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the 408 
economy’ (accumulation function); 409 
4. External representation: to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, 410 
extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business 411 
interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national 412 
interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism and 413 
generating ‘combined and uneven development’ as a consequence). 414 
 415 
These key relations form, then, the basis for the constitution of food regimes, as subsidiary 416 
aspects of the functioning of the political economy of the state-capital nexus within the world 417 
capitalist system. With the first a basic premise of capitalist social-property relations, the 418 
relative importance of these relations will vary across space and time according to: 419 
1. The class complexion of the state-capital nexus; 420 
2. The ‘spatial’ location of the state-capital nexus (social formation) within the world 421 
system, whether ‘core’, ‘semi-periphery’, or ‘periphery’; 422 
3. The ‘temporal’ location of the state-capital nexus within the overall trajectory of 423 
capitalism in terms of its developmental path dependency, e.g., the shift from 424 
competitive to monopoly capitalism. 425 
 426 
Capitalism, in intimate conjunction with the state, thus generates food regimes as integral 427 
parts of its growth and power dynamic. This has a threefold logic which is tied up with both 428 
the accumulation and legitimation aspects of the state-capital nexus: first, to supply food, on 429 
a reasonably secure basis, to its expropriated labour force, now largely divorced from its 430 
means of production, thereby hopefully securing its quiescence (relations 1 and 2 above); 431 
second, to supply this as cheaply and abundantly as possible, vital in exerting downward 432 
pressure on the socially average wage and thus in maximising surplus value in the production 433 
of competitive commodities, and in ensuring a transfer of surplus from agriculture to nascent 434 
industries (relations 3 and 4); and, third, to afford opportunities for profit-making by the 435 
various class fractions of agrarian capital (relations 3 and 4). As indicated, the state-capital 436 
nexus deploys all the four relations specified above to secure this logic. These relations may 437 
be complementary, as in ‘articulated’ economies, or they may be antagonistic, as in 438 
‘disarticulated’ economies. 439 
 440 
 441 
Proposing a Revised Periodization of Food Regimes 442 
 443 
With these basic, framing dynamics in mind we can propose the following, revised, typology 444 
of capitalist food regimes. (It may be helpful to recall again, for purposes of comparison, 445 
Friedmann and McMichael’s own schema of three global food regimes: the First (1870s-446 
1930s); the Second (1950s-1970s); and the Third (from 1980s-present), the latter described 447 
as the ‘corporate food regime’ by McMichael (2013) and as the ‘corporate-environmental 448 
regime’ by Friedmann (2005)): 449 
1. The First National Capitalist Food Regime, 1750-1846 – the ‘First’ Agricultural 450 
Revolution in England and Scotland from 1750. Whereas, before 1750, increases in 451 
production and productivity had come up against the lack of a suitable consumer 452 
market, because a ‘surplus’ population the new proletariat had been unable to secure 453 
consistent employment in industry, the progressive boost lent to industrial production 454 
by the slavery ‘subsidy’ from the American colonies as the century matured (an 455 
example of ‘combined and uneven development), translated into increased 456 
employment and an expanded market. The opportunities for profit-making that 457 
followed stimulated changes in agricultural yields and productivity. The capitalist 458 
structure of agricultural production and competitive rental agreements with yeoman 459 
tenants enforced high yields and productivity to meet this new demand. Landlords 460 
under these conditions could see clear opportunities for rent increases, and the age 461 
of agricultural ‘improvement’ that accompanied this was ushered in after 1750. 462 
Agricultural prices remained relatively buoyant as urban population and consumption, 463 
with ‘real subsumption’ of labour, proceeded apace. Sustained war with France from 464 
1793 saw wheat prices skyrocket, and they remained high until the repeal of the Corn 465 
Laws in 1846. Thus, once the industrial revolution had been ‘pump-primed’ by the 466 
confluence of a growing wage-dependent proletariat and ‘artificially’ cheap calories 467 
and raw materials for manufacture, a virtuous articulation could be established 468 
between increased yields in agriculture, increased domestic consumption, and 469 
increased profits. This halcyon period for capitalist agriculture in Britain, comprising 470 
the age of ‘improvement’ or the ’first’ agricultural revolution (Overton 1996), was to 471 
continue until the middle of the nineteenth century with the repeal of the Corn Laws 472 
and the introduction of free trade; 473 
2. The First International, or ‘Liberal’, Food Regime 1846-1870. The British ‘Liberal’ or 474 
‘Free Trade’ Food Regime that arose during the middle of the nineteenth century may 475 
be said to represent the first capitalist food regime founded on the integration of 476 
‘core’ states (notably Germany and France) as, for the first time, predominantly 477 
capitalist economies. This arose because, in Britain, the cost of cereals, the main item 478 
in the working-class diet, became too high due to protectionism and due to the 479 
inability of the ‘organic’ four-course rotation system to sustain output increases 480 
(Overton 1996). This was leading to a squeeze on profits and, consequently, to 481 
pressure by industrial capitalists to look for cheaper supplies. These pressures could 482 
be eased by ‘spatio-temporal’ fixes in the form of bilateral trade agreements with 483 
complementary class fractional interests overseas, and, in so doing, drawing on a 484 
‘frontier’ of extraction where labour and/or the conditions of production were 485 
cheaper. Britain thus began to invoke the principle of ‘comparative advantage’, 486 
whereby wage foods should be sourced from wherever they could be produced most 487 
‘cheaply’ (in this case mainland Europe and, later, North America), supplying in turn a 488 
competitive boost to Britain’s preeminent industrial status.  489 
3. The Second International, or ‘Imperial’, Food Regime 1870-1930. Increasingly cheap 490 
imports, based on the ‘soil subsidy’ through the exploitation of previously 491 
uncultivated soils in the USA particularly, began to compromise the profits of the 492 
Prussian Junkers, the most powerful class in Germany, as a result of loss of grain sales 493 
to Britain. At the same time, these cheap food imports undermined agricultural 494 
production more generally in Europe, threatening considerable social unrest. At the 495 
same time, German industrialists were constrained in their ability to accumulate as a 496 
result of continuing competition from Britain. Thus, there developed a new confluence 497 
of interest between the agricultural and industrial class fractions of German capital. 498 
Protectionist, rather than free trade, policies began to be favoured, and the German 499 
state was, at the same time (from 1871), consolidated. These developments coincided 500 
with an over-accumulation crisis, a cyclical tendency that capital could overcome in 501 
two possible ways: first, by moving away from an extensive and quantitative mode of 502 
growth (absolute surplus value) towards an intensive or qualitative (relative surplus 503 
value) one, which implied that the working classes needed to be integrated 504 
increasingly in a virtuous circle of enlarged production and expanded consumption. 505 
This imbricated nicely with sectoral articulation and new nationhood (social 506 
articulation), so that both accumulation and legitimation needs could be satisfied in 507 
the states of the core. The second means of overcoming over-accumulation was by 508 
supplementing and underwriting qualitative growth through the importation of super-509 
cheap primary commodities from the periphery (primary means) and by securing 510 
captive markets in those regions (secondary means). Under conditions of rival, rather 511 
than complementary capitalisms, these means were secured through imperialism. 512 
Competitive, protectionist, and nationalistic economies, bolstered by racialized 513 
ideologies of ‘social imperialism’, generated an underlying dynamic of mutual 514 
aggression that was to erupt eventually in the First World War. In the aftermath 515 
Germany was effectively destroyed, for a while, as a competitor capitalist nation, and 516 
caused a temporary trend, following the war, away from autocentrism and towards 517 
‘free trade’ policies until over-accumulation struck again with a vengeance towards 518 
the end of the 1920s, with the Great Depression as the outcome. This stimulated a 519 
return to autocentrism and protectionism during the 1930s.  520 
4. The Third International, or ‘Political Productivist’, Food Regime 1930-1980. The need 521 
to build ‘articulated’ economies from the 1930s and, particularly, in the post-Second 522 
World War era in the face of the communist ‘threat’, to defuse socialist movements 523 
whilst securing capital accumulation, and to address agricultural commodity 524 
oversupply in the USA, led to intensified ‘state-centred’ accumulation of ‘political 525 
productivism’ or Fordism, classically in the ‘core’ states. Wage increases were 526 
balanced by productivity increases through the realization of relative surplus value, 527 
while increased output was absorbed by increased consumption. These developments 528 
were mirrored in the agri-food sector, where massive increases productivity and 529 
absolute increases in yields, produced ‘cheap’ wage foods from within the nation for 530 
the industrial proletariat. Labour within agriculture was simultaneously shed, but 531 
could be absorbed without contradiction by the industrial sector. Restructuring was 532 
undertaken deliberately to favour the capitalist family farm, however, with the state 533 
engineering a ‘farmer road’ to capitalism. Peasant agriculture (that is, self-subsistent 534 
farming) largely disappeared from Western Europe and North America. Productivism 535 
led, over time, to over-supply (over-production) of agri-food commodities, leading to 536 
downward pressure on prices, an increased subsidy burden in what was a state-537 
supported system, and, thereby, to increased pressure to export surpluses, principally 538 
to the global South. At the same time, productivism’s ecological contradictions led to 539 
increasing calls for constraints on production and the diversion of funds to support 540 
agri-environmental schemes and wider rural diversification measures. The 541 
concentration of capital in the agri-food sector and beyond led to calls for increasing 542 
liberalization of trade and trans-nationalization of production, so that profitability 543 
could be restored through the exploitation of cheaper sources of supply in the global 544 
South. However, this advocacy of globalization and reduction in subsidy in the global 545 
North by transnational capital fractions was contested by neo-mercantilist and social 546 
welfare constituencies, leading to the retention of certain ‘market constraining’ 547 
features in the core states to mitigate the impacts of full liberalization. By contrast, 548 
the global South was ‘opened up’ following the subsidized destruction of its staple 549 
food producers by means of dumping. This engendered pressure for neoliberalization, 550 
instantiated in the founding of the new World Trade Organization (WTO) as the 551 
outcome of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations.  552 
5. The Fourth International, or ‘Neoliberal’, Food Regime 1980-2010. Reciprocal 553 
relations between imperial transnational capital and the agro-exporting oligarchy in 554 
the periphery led to the exploitation of ever larger areas in the latter for export of 555 
agricultural commodities to the North. The North, however, refused itself to embrace 556 
fully ‘free market’ norms, retaining, primarily for reasons of political legitimacy, 557 
generous, although increasingly ‘decoupled’, supports for its farmers (see Tilzey 2006, 558 
2018). This accorded with the continuing imperial role of the North vis-à-vis the South, 559 
the latter constrained to adopt in full the norms of neoliberalism. Simultaneously, 560 
there was increased migration of industrial manufacturing from the North to the 561 
South, subsidized by super-exploitation of labour and the ‘functional dualism’ of semi-562 
proletarianization. This, together with the resurgence of extractivism, led to the 563 
further erosion of the self-subsistent peasantry which became formally subsumed, as 564 
a semi-proletariat, within capitalist relations of production. This peasantry did, 565 
however, retain crucial links to land, but this land was generally insufficient to secure 566 
full ‘autonomy’ from capitalism. In this way, continuing poverty, ecological 567 
degradation, and loss of productive land to capital led to an upwelling of agrarian-568 
based, and anti-neoliberal, protest during the 1990s and early 2000s, particularly in 569 
Latin America. Food sovereignty claims within both a national developmentalist and a 570 
post-developmentalist discourse began to be articulated. 571 
6. The Fifth International, or ‘Post-Neoliberal’, Food Regime. As the new millennium 572 
progressed, neoliberalism began to encounter increasing contradiction: in terms of 573 
capital accumulation, whereby greatly increased wealth disparities generated a crisis 574 
of commodity under-consumption (over-accumulation) (the financial crisis of 2007 575 
was symptomatic of this trend); in terms, relatedly, of greatly increased precarity for 576 
the global majority, located particularly in the global South, and induced by 577 
heightened processes of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession, 578 
leading to inability of the precariat to access even basic necessities (the 2008 global 579 
food crisis was symptomatic of this trend); and in terms of a progressive deterioration 580 
in the biophysical fabric of the planet and its ability to continue to supply resources 581 
to, and absorb waste from, an ever more profligate capitalism. In order to manage 582 
and mitigate (but not resolve) these contradictions, states re-emerged ‘from the 583 
shadows’ to take again more interventionist roles in securing accumulation and 584 
legitimation functions for capital. These roles are manifested in a number of different 585 
ways: through greater market intervention, or neo-mercantilism, to secure food and 586 
energy supplies both domestically and overseas (the latter in part through ‘land-587 
grabbing’); through the adoption of neo-developmental and redistributive policies to 588 
alleviate poverty, as in the ‘pink tide’ states of Latin America; and through efforts by 589 
right-wing governments to legitimate and obscure the impacts of capital accumulation 590 
through authoritarian populism (Trumpism being an exemplar) and neo-imperialism. 591 
These developments suggest the fragmentation of neoliberal hegemony, if not as yet 592 
its supersession, and a return to heightened inter-state competition and antagonism 593 
reminiscent of the ‘Imperial’ Food Regime. 594 
 595 
The justification for, and detailed characterization of, the first four of the above food regimes 596 
is presented in … (reference withheld for peer review purposes). It is the proposed fifth 597 
regime that we will focus on in the remainder of this paper. This is both because it exemplifies 598 
well the way in which our revised theoretical base enables us to define anew food regimes, 599 
arising from our dialectical understanding of capital, state, and class, and the dynamics of 600 
‘combined and uneven development’; and because the existence of a ‘post-neoliberal’ food 601 
regime has not been seriously or systematically broached hitherto (although see Belesky and 602 
Lawrence (2018) for tentative moves in this direction). Indeed, some still dispute the 603 
existence of a truly ‘neoliberal’ food regime (see, for example, Pritchard 2009) precisely 604 
because of the retention of mercantilist and protectionist elements in agricultural policy by 605 
the global North, which Pritchard interprets as a ‘hangover’ from the previous regime. But, as 606 
suggested above, such asymmetrical retention of protections and supports by the global 607 
North vis-à-vis the global South is something to be expected and understood if we see 608 
unmitigated neoliberalism to be a manifestation of neo-imperialism in the latter, and 609 
mitigated, or ‘embedded’, neoliberalism to be a feature of the former, the imperium (see 610 
Tilzey 2006, 2016). Below we will examine the key features and dynamics of the ‘Post-611 
Neoliberal’ Food Regime, these manifest most particularly in: a) the appearance of ‘land-612 
grabbing’ and neo-extractivism in the peripheries; b) the emergence of China, particularly, as 613 
a sub-imperium; and c) the rise of the Latin American ‘pink tide’ states as a response to 614 
neoliberalism, and within the favourable international conjuncture defined by China’s 615 
ascendance.  616 
 617 
The ‘Post-Neoliberal’ Food Regime: Land-Grabbing and Neo-extractivism, the emergence of 618 
China as a sub-imperium, and the dynamics of the ‘pink tide’ states in Latin America  619 
We suggested above that neoliberal hegemony is now fragmenting, if not as yet subject to 620 
complete supersession, and we are in a conjuncture characterized by a return to heightened 621 
inter-state competition and antagonism reminiscent of the ‘Imperial’ Food Regime. We seem, 622 
therefore, to be currently in the throes of an immanent, epochal, crisis of neoliberalism, if 623 
not yet of capitalism in general. Imperial monopoly-finance capital has escalated its 624 
accumulation of land and natural resources in the peripheries. Money alone, however, is 625 
becoming no longer adequate to ensure continuing, and cheap, supply of food and energy to 626 
these consumption heartlands of neoliberalism. The imperative of the imperium, together 627 
and in competition with the ‘BRICS’ states, to secure such supply is reflected in the tendential 628 
turn to ‘neo-productivism’ at home, and to ‘land-grabbing’ in the periphery, with increasing 629 
recourse to overt state/imperial intervention to realize this end. Thus, while it appeared, as 630 
recently as 2006, that the neoliberal food regime had resolved the agrarian question in its 631 
favour through the global allocation of ‘comparative advantages’ in the quest for enhanced 632 
rates of profit (Akram-Lodhi and Kay 2009) and the ‘secure’ supply of food according to 633 
market norms, the subsequent global food crisis has revealed the spectre of food insecurity 634 
stalking even the imperium and the inadequacy of money alone to assure the continuing flow 635 
of cheap and abundant food. Land-grabbing, particularly, reveals the ‘invisible hand’ of 636 
neoliberal market rules to be little more than a thin ideological veil concealing the ‘visible 637 
boot’ of core-periphery class exploitative relations (Araghi 2009), as the immanent 638 
dependence of transnational capital upon state imperial power (in alliance with peripheral 639 
‘extroverted’ classes) to secure surplus value from the extractive frontier is realized as ‘agro-640 
security mercantilism’ (see McMichael 2010, 2013. McMichael does not seem to have 641 
absorbed the implications of this for his ‘corporate’ food regime, however.). We might well 642 
refer to this changed relation as ‘formal imperialism’ in all but name. 643 
Thus, since 2007, an estimated 220 million hectares has been acquired by foreign investors in 644 
the global South (Borras et al. 2010; Veltmeyer 2017). This global land grab has been 645 
stimulated in part by crises in food and oil markets since 2007, and in part by the opportunity 646 
to make super-profits through ‘accumulation by dispossession’, by extracting and exporting 647 
primary commodities. Additionally, the financialization of these markets has provided 648 
lucrative new investment opportunities for sovereign wealth funds, hedge funds, and global 649 
agri-business (Veltmeyer 2017). But, importantly, these dynamics exhibit trends away from 650 
pure neoliberalism and a modest, if significant, shift in the centre of gravity of global power 651 
towards the sub-imperium. Thus, while imperial agencies, both corporations and 652 
governments, dominate as investors and ‘land grabbers’, the BRICS states and food-insecure 653 
Middle Eastern oil states in certain regional contexts, are also active competitors. China and 654 
Malaysia, for example, dominate investments in land acquisition in Asia, South Africa exhibits 655 
potential dominance in Africa, while China and Brazil are emerging as major sub-imperial 656 
powers in Latin America within the context of neo-extractivism (see below). The rationale 657 
behind land grabbing for these states is not principally the accumulation of capital in a direct 658 
sense, but rather the satisfaction of domestic food and energy security, and therefore 659 
legitimacy, needs, thereby bypassing unreliable and expensive international food/energy 660 
markets. 661 
The Northern imperium, attempting to uphold the ‘new imperialism’ (Harvey 2002) of 662 
neoliberalism in the global South, faces three political challenges here. The first two represent 663 
sub-hegemonic class challenges, within the semi-peripheral and peripheral state-capital 664 
nexus, to the hegemony of neoliberalism: firstly, the national sovereignty regime established 665 
in the twentieth century, although attenuated, is nonetheless still exercised even by the small 666 
states, often in the form of neo-developmentalism, supported by means of neo-extractivism 667 
(Veltmeyer and Petras 2014); secondly, the emerging semi-peripheries (the sub-imperium), 668 
the unintended consequence of globalization, have created new spaces and opportunities for 669 
manoeuvre by peripheral states, notably the ‘pink tide’ states of Latin America. Monopolistic 670 
firms are springing up in the sub-imperium, notably the BRICS states (China, India, Brazil, 671 
South Africa) and scrambling themselves for natural resources, land, and food supplies. These 672 
often maintain a higher commitment to the sovereignty regime and to national development, 673 
as is the case with China particularly, than the global Northern imperium. The third challenge 674 
arises from counter-hegemonic groups (middle and lower peasantries, semi-proletarians, 675 
indigenous groups particularly) propounding a post-capitalist way of ‘good living’ akin to eco-676 
socialism (Lowy 2013).  677 
The first form of ‘sub-hegemonic’, peripheral, resistance to neoliberalism derives in important 678 
respects from ‘internal’ state-level dynamics that can be understood only from the class 679 
analytical and state-capital nexus perspective invoked in this paper. This has been facilitated, 680 
but not caused, ‘externally’ by the rise of the sub-imperium, notably China. Neither of these 681 
phenomena can be understood from a perspective of a monolithic or fully trans-nationalised 682 
capitalism such as advocated by Robinson (2017) or McMichael (2013) (see Tilzey 2016). 683 
China, in particular, and representing the second form of ‘sub-hegemonic’, or semi-peripheral 684 
resistance to neoliberalism, has deployed neoliberal globalization as a strategic means of 685 
strengthening the industrial and military infrastructure of the state as a counterweight to the 686 
northern imperium, particularly the USA. China’s emergence as a key site of capital 687 
accumulation has, as noted, opened up a space for other states in the global South to re-688 
assert more nationally-based capitalist development or, at least, for national class fractions 689 
of capital to selectively displace global Northern dominance. This has coincided with 690 
neoliberalism’s widespread loss of legitimacy in the global South, and in Latin America 691 
particularly. The boom in primary commodity prices stimulated by China’s growth has 692 
enabled sub-hegemonic fractions of national capital to ally with non-capitalist class (counter-693 
hegemonic) forces to install a wave of populist, centre-left (‘pink tide’) regimes in Latin 694 
America (Spronk and Webber 2015). Here, therefore, there is an asymmetrical symbiosis 695 
between the sub-imperium, supporting national development through neo-mercantilism, and 696 
the ‘pink tide’ states of the periphery, seeking to pursue redistributive national-popular 697 
programmes on the proceeds of neo-extractivism.  698 
China itself faces the ineluctable contradictions of capitalism, however. With the rural semi-699 
proletariat no longer subsidizing the cost of industrial labour due the process of progressive 700 
full proletarianization (see Tilzey 2018), wage demands have been increasing, and China faces 701 
the prospect of losing its ‘comparative advantage’ in low labour power costs. This would 702 
potentially entail the migration of industry overseas to still cheaper areas of production such 703 
as Vietnam and Bangladesh, the suppression of wage demands, or the increased replacement 704 
of labour through mechanization. China thus confronts the ‘political’ contradiction of 705 
attempting to sustain high rates of growth in the face of rising labour costs, due to increasing 706 
full proletarianization of its labour force, and in the face of stagnating global demand, due to 707 
over-production/under-consumption crisis (see Tilzey 2018). Meanwhile, it attempts to 708 
maintain downward pressure on costs of production through the increasing import of energy, 709 
minerals, and indeed food, as ‘cheaps’ (Moore 2015), from overseas, undertaken by means 710 
of extractivism and ‘land-grabbing’ as a form of neo-mercantilism. Looming scarcity of 711 
‘cheaps’ has stimulated China to seek access and control of petroleum, mineral, and agri-food 712 
resources on a global scale, bringing it, of course, into increasing competition with the other 713 
major centres of manufacturing and consumption, principally the states of the imperium. 714 
Soya production has been prominent in Chinese stimulated agro-extractivism in Latin 715 
America, with Bolivia playing an important role among the ‘pink tide’ states (McKay 2017). 716 
Through increasing political resistance in the zones of extractivism, through the inevitable 717 
secular depletion of resources, and through the unavoidable need to address unsustainable 718 
levels of pollution at home, rising costs will also constitute an ‘ecological’ contradiction for 719 
Chinese capital accumulation.  720 
These dynamics we can understand through our revised causal basis for defining food 721 
regimes, these comprising a sub-set of politico-economic relations within and between 722 
different state-capital nexus. These are the key relations between capital and state which the 723 
state-capital nexus deploys to secure economic growth and political stability, and which 724 
frame the form and function of food regimes. In the case of China these are principally and in 725 
order of priority:  726 
1. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital 727 
fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the 728 
economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national 729 
development’;  730 
2. External representation: to represent the external interests of ‘domestic’ capital, 731 
extending from economic diplomacy to the forceful, or military, protection of business 732 
interests (accumulation and legitimation function, the latter elevating the ‘national 733 
interest’ above class and class fractional interest in the service of nationalism).This 734 
takes the form of neo-mercantilism (incorporating ‘land-grabbing’ and agro-735 
extractivism), when accumulation demands grow beyond the capacity of the national 736 
territory to supply primary commodities in quantity and cheapness sufficient to secure 737 
continued competitive accumulation and the quiescence of the workforce;  738 
3. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social and ecological impacts of capital 739 
accumulation and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to 740 
reproduce the subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function).  741 
In the case of the ‘pink tide’ states, these are principally, and in order of priority:  742 
1. Market correction: to mitigate the destructive social impacts of capital accumulation 743 
and, more generally, to manage the capital-labour relation, and to reproduce the 744 
subordination of the labour force to capital (legitimation function). This assumes the 745 
form of social support and welfarism, through which subaltern classes may purchase 746 
food at reasonable cost. Such food is increasingly imported, however, although 747 
Ecuador has paid some attention to expanding the production of traditional food 748 
staples by the small farm commercial sector (upper peasantry);  749 
2. Market direction: to direct and supervise capital accumulation when private capital 750 
fails, or is unable, to do so, commonly referred to as ‘state intervention in the 751 
economy’ (accumulation function). This is deployed in the service of ‘national 752 
development’, largely in the form of the state syphoning off an increased share of 753 
extractivism’s proceeds via ground rent. However, little in the way of ‘national 754 
capitalism’ has eventuated, with most funds being directed to infrastructure 755 
construction as employment generation schemes. There has been little attempt to 756 
improve the national production of food staples (other than Ecuador above) and the 757 
primary focus remains upon agro-extractivism within the sector.  758 
Here, populism, as a national-popular programme of development, pursues a form of 759 
redistributive capitalism, focusing on the accumulation needs of its core sub-hegemonic class 760 
constituency, while using the proceeds of neo-extractivism (generated largely by the agrarian 761 
oligarchy and transnational capital) to placate counter-hegemonic classes through welfarism. 762 
This enables the structural bases of inequality and poverty to be temporarily by-passed or 763 
mitigated, but only at the cost of deepening the political and ecological contradictions of 764 
extractive capitalism. As these contradictions deepen, exacerbated by ‘jobless’ growth and 765 
high dependency on external markets, so does social unrest grow commensurately. The 766 
response of the ruling bloc in the ‘pink tide’ states is a turn to increasing authoritarianism to 767 
push through its programme of accelerated commodification and destruction of the 768 
biophysical foundations for sustainable living (buen vivir) in the name of short-lived growth 769 
and consumerism. Under these conditions, a de-legitimation of ‘left’ populism threatens, and 770 
a resurgent right, ‘flying the flag of nationalism’ (Malamud 2017) is poised to take over the 771 
baton of authoritarian populism (Herrera 2017). As ‘left’ populism moves to the right and the 772 
right itself invokes national populism, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish the two 773 
variants of authoritarian populism, both premised on a programme of neo-extractivism.  774 
These profound and deepening contradictions, both ‘political’ and ‘ecological’, of the ‘Post-775 
Neoliberal’ food regime across the inter-related dynamics of imperium, sub-imperium, and 776 
periphery, imply that it is inherently unstable. While all capitalist food regimes are unstable, 777 
achieving at best only provisional equilibrium, the present regime may prove 778 
unprecedentedly so. Indeed, this regime may mark the endgame of capitalism in general, as 779 
it encounters an epochal crisis defined by spiralling political and ecological turmoil. We may 780 
speculate, perhaps hoping against hope, that the ‘capitalogenic’ apocalypse which threatens 781 
to engulf our planet over the next century may foment an unprecedented resurgence of the 782 
third anti-imperial challenge identified earlier, arising from counter-hegemonic groups 783 
propounding a post-capitalist way of ‘good living’, ushering in a non-capitalist food regime as 784 
‘radical’ food sovereignty (see Tilzey 2017, 2018). 785 
 786 
Conclusion 787 
This paper has sought to undertake a reassessment and critique of Friedmann and 788 
McMichael’s seminal 1989 paper. Our critique has sought both to uphold the tradition of 789 
radical political economy that informed Friedmann and McMichael’s paper, and the value of 790 
the concept of the food regime itself. Our critique, therefore, has taken place from within 791 
that tradition. That tradition is a broad church, however, and there is much controversy within 792 
it. Friedmann and McMichael’s work exhibits the clear influence of the Braudel-Wallerstein-793 
Arrighi line of thinking, complemented by that of Polanyi, together with, detrimentally, only 794 
a partial incorporation of RT. We have suggested that the influence of WST and the failure to 795 
embrace RT in plenary, together with the neglect of a rich vein of non-reductive Marxian 796 
theory in the form of ‘Political Marxism’ and neo-Gramscian thinking, have been both 797 
pervasive and detrimental to Friedmann and McMichael’s formulation of FRT in terms of their 798 
understanding of capitalism, the state, and class dynamics, with clear adverse implications for 799 
the way in which they conceive causality underlying food regimes and the periodization of 800 
those food regimes. Indeed, we have suggested that this limited incorporation of RT and the 801 
neglect of more agential and ‘political’ currents in Marxian theory, were significant factors in 802 
the ‘turn’ to post-structural approaches in critical rural geography and sociology in the 1990s. 803 
Consequently, we have attempted remedy these asserted deficiencies in Friedmann and 804 
McMichael’s presentation of FRT, by delineating a revised causal basis for understanding 805 
capitalist food regimes and their dynamics on the basis of a novel fusion of Political Marxism, 806 
neo-Gramscian IPE, RT, and Poulantzian state-capital theory. This body of thought throws a 807 
significantly different light on the categories of, and relations between, capital, state, class, 808 
structure and agency than the WST and an accumulation-biased RT deployed by Friedmann 809 
and McMichael. It has also enabled us, on this different causal basis, to present a revised and 810 
more comprehensive periodization of capitalist food regimes, extending from the birth of the 811 
first capital-state nexus in England in the late eighteenth century through to the current re-812 
emergence of overt state management of, and inter-state competition around, flows of food 813 
and resources in what we have chosen to call the ‘Post-Neoliberal’ regime. 814 
 815 
i McMichael (2013) prefers the term ‘Food Regime Analysis’. 
ii Although FRT owed an equal or greater debt to World Systems Theory. 
iii These assigning each region of the world economy to a specific zone: core, periphery, or semi-periphery. 
Similarly, each zone was assigned a specific form of labour control which corresponded to the specific form of 
economic activity in which the particular region had come to specialize. Thus, class structure is determined 
primarily by the form of economic activity in which the specific region specializes and the mode of labour 
control which ‘corresponds’ to that form of production. In turn, political forms or states arise out of the needs 
of the dominant classes in the three zones. 
iv ‘Class’ is deployed here in a non-reductive sense whereby power relations and exploitation may be 
expressed and take place through class, ethnic, racial, gender, religious, etc. categories. It is also to recognize 
that ‘objective’ class position may not translate into ‘subjective’ class positionality, and that the latter can only 
be understood through the ways that exploitation and discrimination are actually experienced and understood 
by actors, as expressed in terms of ‘cultural politics’. Such a non-reductive understanding of class follows in the 
political and cultural traditions of Marxian thinking exemplified by, for example, Gramsci and E.P. Thompson.  
 
v At risk of anticipating our argument, we will suggest that the nature and balance of class interest within, and 
at the level of, the state appear to be vital determinants of the character of food regimes. The deployment of 
the concept of ‘class’ here seeks to capture the structural character of interests in society and their 
reproduction through agency. Class, as ‘structured agency’, is thus operational at all spatial scales, vitiating the 
dichotomy between supposedly ‘behaviourally’ grounded explanation at local level, and those putatively 
grounded in ‘structure’ at higher and wider scalar levels (see Potter and Tilzey 2005, Tilzey and Potter 2008 for 
further discussion). 
vi Constraints of space forbid discussion here of the ecological dimension of food regimes, but this important 
dimension is addressed by the author at length elsewhere (reference withheld for peer review purposes). 
vii McMichael (2013, 11) makes reference to the ‘mode of regulation’ as expressing a policy environment 
conducive to an ‘accumulation regime’ and its normalization, but the full implications of this concept in terms 
of class, state, capital relations and dynamics are never really explored. 
viii Thus, while they do suggest that ‘it is possible to see a mutual conditioning of the state system and capital’ 
(Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 112) this is clearly conceptualized as an external relation, as is indicated by 
the following: ‘In both movements agriculture became incorporated within accumulation itself, and states and 
national economies became increasingly subordinated to capital. We conclude that the growing power of 
capital to organize and re-organize agriculture undercuts state policies directing agriculture to national ends, 
such as food security, articulated development, and the preservation of rural/peasant communities’ 
(Friedmann and McMichael 1989, 95).  
ix Friedmann (2005) later takes her development of food regime theory a certain way in this direction through 
her notion of ‘implicit rules’ governing each regime, but this, in our view, is never systematically delineated. 
x There may, of course, not be a confluence of interest between dominant class fractions in different states, in 
which case the would-be hegemon will be resisted, and divergent food regimes may then run concurrently, as 
in the case of the ‘Imperial Food Regime’ as defined by Tilzey (2018). 
xi It is unfortunate that the twentieth anniversary commemoration of the 1989 paper in Agriculture and Human 
Values (2009) failed to mention the important work of Potter and Tilzey (2005). In our view, this ‘retrospective’ 
did not really advance the discussion of food regimes significantly, and certainly brought no resolution to the 
global/local/structure/agency issue. Friedmann unsystematically brings into dialogue, but does not resolve, 
debates between FRT and ‘post-structural’ approaches such as Actor-Network Theory, her ‘synthesis’ 
comprising little more than eclecticism. McMichael repeats the well-worn theoretical categories delineated in 
1989. Campbell and Dixon suggest, correctly, that Friedmann and McMichael, through reference to RT, ‘held 
open the latent potential to create a non-linear narrative of capitalist food history and politics’ (2009, 263). 
                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                     
But, we argue, this is a potential that remains latent in Friedmann and McMichael’s work because of the 
failure properly to ground a mode of regulation as a legitimation device, to ground ‘history and politics’ in 
‘class struggle’ (conjoining ‘structure’ and ‘agency’), and, therefore to theorize contingency as, for example, 
‘structured agency’. By contrast, the work of Potter and Tilzey did achieve precisely this, in our view. 
Incidentally, the paper by Campbell in this commemorative issue proposes, questionably, that mainstream 
‘productivism’ and more locally/ecologically-based ‘post-productivism’ be treated as discrete ‘food regimes’. 
Again, however, reference to the work of Potter and Tilzey might have been of some help here, since they 
suggest that ‘post-productivism’ operates essentially as ‘flanking’, legitimation device (as part of a mode of 
regulation) ancillary and subordinate to an emergent ‘market productivism’ (see Potter and Tilzey 2005; Tilzey 
2006; Tilzey and Potter 2007, 2008). 
xii Absolute surplus value refers to an extension of the working day, or intensification of labour, essentially 
without the introduction of labour-saving machinery; relative surplus value refers to an increase in labour 
productivity due to the introduction of labour-saving machinery, thus potentially reducing the length of the 
working day. 
xiii The term is deliberately reversed here because it is the combination of a core with a super-exploited 
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